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UNITED STATES v. SCHLETTE: DEAD MEN 
DO TELL TALES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Schlette,l the Ninth Circuit held that 
disclosure of a criminal presentence report to third party peti-
tioners was appropriate.2 This is the first reported federal case 
in which disclosure to a third party was granted.3 The court 
found that the government had not articulated a legitimate rea-
son for maintaining confidentiality, in light of the petitioners' 
threshold showing of need.4 With this showing, the petitioners 
had overcome the standard approved of in the Ninth Circuit in 
Berry v. Department of Justice." In that case, the court stated 
that disclosure to third parties should not be ordered unless do-
ing so is "necessary to serve the ends of justice."8 
The issue of disclosure of criminal presentence reports has 
been debated at length over the last forty years.7 The develop-
ment in this area has been primarily within the context of dis-
closure to the subjects of the reports.8 This article will examine 
the basis for which disclosure to a third party was allowed for 
the first time. 
1. 842 F.2d 1574 (9th Cir. 1988) (per Thompson, J; the other panel members were 
Noonan, J., and Anderson, J.). 
2. [d. at 1584. 
3. [d. at 1579. There has been one unreported case where a court ordered disclosure 
of a presentence report to a third party in the interest of justice. United States v. 
Charmer Indus., 711 F.2d 1164, 1173 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. Bernstein, 
CR 81 160 (E.n.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1982) (transcript of a hearing in which the court disclosed 
the report in the interest of justice». 
4. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1584. 
5. 733 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1984). 
6. [d. at 1352. 
7. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1578. 
8. [d. 
91 
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II. FACTS 
In 1955, Malcolm R. Schlette was convicted of arson in Ma-
rin County, California.9 The man who successfully prosecuted 
the case was Marin County District Attorney William O. Weis-
sich.10 Schlette never forgave Weissich and vowed to kill him.ll 
After serving eleven years of a twenty-year sentence, Schlette 
was paroled, only to violate his parole on the day of his release.12 
He was returned to prison to serve the remaining nine years of 
his sentence, and was again released in 1975.13 In 1983, he 
pleaded guilty to felonious possession of a firearm and was 
placed on probation. 1. In 1986, while still on probation, Schlette 
kept his thirty year old vow; he shot and killed W eissich. 1& 
Schlette then committed suicide.16 
The Estate of Weissich and a local newspaper17 each peti-
tioned the district court to release Schlette's presentence report, 
postsentence report and psychiatric report. 16 The estate re-
quested disclosure in order to determine whether the court's 
probation service knew of the danger to Weissich's life and was 
9. United States v. Schlette, 842 F.2d 1574, 1576 (9th Cir. 1988). See Marin Indep. 
J., Apr. 7, 1987, at A3, col. 1. Schlette was convicted of setting a fire at the Bleu Baie 
Tavern in Marshall, California. The establishment was operated by Schlette's estranged 
wife. He was given a 20 year sentence for a fire that caused six dollars damage. Id. 
10. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1576. 
11. Id. See Marin Indep. J., Nov. 19, 1986, at AI, col. 5. Besides Weissich, there 
were others on Schlette's "hit list," a typed note left in his Santa Rosa apartment which 
targeted the persons who helped send him to prison. They were Charles Daniels, then a 
San Rafael insurance investigator; arson investigator Fred DuPuis; Sid Stinson, then a 
Marin County undersheriff; and private investigator Nick Giampali. Id. 
12. Marin Indep. J., Nov. 19, 1986, at A2, col. 4. 
13. Id. at A2, col. 5. After failing to report to his parole officer, Schlette apparently 
tried to buy weapons in San Francisco-a bazooka and a steel vest. After failing to do so, 
he went to Los Angeles to buy guns. He was apprehended soon afterwards in Santa 
Monica.ld. 
14. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1576. Schlette pleaded guilty to a weapons charge under 18 
U.S.C. § 1202(a)(l) (repealed 1986). 
15. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1576. 
16. Id. Schlette's van was stopped by the police three blocks away from where Weis-
sich was killed. Marin Indep. J., Nov. 19, 1986 at A3, col. 1. Apparently, in fear of immi-
nent capture, he took a number of cyanide pills. Id. Found on the body or in the van 
were a Ruger .223-caliber gun, a .45-caliber Colt pistol, ammunition, a survival knife, an 
electronic stun gun, a gas mask, and fake explosives. See Marin Indep. J., Nov. 20, 1986 
at AI, col. 2. 
17. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1576. The newspaper was the Marin Independent Journal. 
Id. 
18. Id. 
2
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negligent in not warning him. Ie The newspaper argued that dis-
closure would facilitate the public interest by informing the pub-
lic about sentencing procedures.2o The district court denied the 
requests, and both parties appealed.21 The Ninth Circuit consol-
idated the appeals and dismissed them for lack of standing.22 
Both parties filed writs of mandamus to compel the district 
court to disclose the requested documents.23 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. The Presentence Report 
After a criminal defendant has been found guilty, the dis-
trict court's probation service files a presentence investigation 
report.24 The primary purpose of the report is to facilitate the 
court's determination of an appropriate sentence.211 After a thor-
ough investigation of the defendant's background, a report is 
compiled which includes personal information and procedural 
19. [d. 
20. [d. at 1582. Additionally, the newspaper asserted a request for the documents 
under the Freedom Of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982), as well as a first 
amendment right of access to the documents. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1582. Finding that 
disclosure in the present case was warranted without reference to either the FOIA or the 
first amendment, the court declined to rule on those portions of the petitioners' argu-
ments. [d. 
21. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1576. The Weissich family asked for the court records, 
saying that they needed evidence for possible claims against the psychiatrist who ex-
amined Schlette, the U.S. Probation Office or other federal authorities. See Marin Indep. 
J., Apr. 7, 1987, at AI, col. 2. 
22. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1576. Third parties who have been denied access to under-
lying proceedings in which they were not parties in district court have no standing to 
appeal. [d. (citing United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982) (decision by 
district court barring access by media and public to certain portions of a criminal pro-
ceeding reviewed on petition of writ of mandamus, but not on appeal, as petitioners were 
not parties to the proceedings». 
23. [d. Because presentence reports are court records, and disclosure of them to 
third parties is not expressly controlled by any statute, control of them rests within the 
discretion of the court. [d. at 1577. 
24. Julian v. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, 806 F.2d 1411, 1414 (9th Cir. 1986), (copies of 
their presentence reports were disclosed to prisoners under the FOIA), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 
1606 (1988). 
25. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, PUB. No. 105, THE 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT at 1 (1978) [hereinafter THE PRESENTENCE INVESTI-
GATION REPORT). Additionally, the report serves other functions. It provides aid to the 
probation officer in supervising efforts during probation or parole; assists prison officials 
in classifying, planning rehabilitation programs for and releasing the subject; aids in the 
consideration of parole; and serves as a source of research information. [d. 
3
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details.2S It describes the defendant's character and personality, 
discusses the defendant's relationships with others, discloses the 
factors underlying the defendant's specific offense and conduct 
in general, and evaluates his or her problems and needs.27 The 
court is required to prepare a presentence report unless the de-
fendant, with the court's permission, waives it. 28 The court may 
also dispense with the report's preparation if it finds sufficient 
information in the record to enable the court to determine an 
appropriate sentence.29 
B. DISCLOSURE To DEFENDANTS 
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3)(A), the 
district court is required to release the presentence report to the 
defendant and his counsel within a reasonable time before sen-
tencing.so The underlying rationale for such disclosure is to al-
low the defendant to introduce testimony or other evidence 
which may highlight any factual inaccuracies in the report or to 
clarify the information used in the sentencing decision. SI 
26. See Fennel & Hall, Due Process at Sentencing: An Empirical and Legal Analy-
sis of the Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal Courts, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1615, 
1624-25 (1979) [hereinafter Fennel & Hall]. The report includes, inter alia, any prior 
criminal record of the defendant; an official version of the offense in question supplied 
by the United States Attorney; the defendant's version of the offense; information con-
cerning loss or harm suffered by any victim of the crime; personal and family data such 
as marital status, education, military history, employment history, and financial status; 
information provided by interviews with family and friends, social services agencies, and 
employers; and clinical evaluations of the defendant's physical and mental health. [d. 
27. See THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 25, at 1. 
28. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(l) provides: 
29. [d. 
The probation service of the court shall make a presentence 
investigation and report to the court before imposition of sen-
tence or the granting of probation unless, with the permission 
of the court, the defendant waives a presentence investigation 
and report, or the court finds that there is in the record infor-
mation sufficient to enable the meaningful exercise of sentenc-
ing discretion, and the court explains this finding on the 
record. 
30. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A). See infra note 36 for text of statute. 
31. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 advisory committee's note. The original version of Rule 
32(c) contained no language pertaining to disclosure. United States v. Schlette, 842 F.2d 
1574, 1578 (9th Cir. 1988). Debate would continue for some time over whether 
mandatory disclosure to the defendant should be incorporated. [d. The 1966 revision of 
the rule left disclosure to the discretion of the court, a practice to which many of the 
courts were already adhering. [d. In 1974, Congress would further expand the defend-
ant's access to the presentence report by amending the rule to require the district court 
4
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Courts had commonly asserted that confidentiality, includ-
ing nondisclosure to the defendant, was necessary to protect the 
"sentencing court's ability to obtain data on a confidential basis 
from the accused and from sources other than the accused for 
use in the sentencing process."32 The argument was made that, 
without confidentiality, courts would not receive the most com-
plete information possible for determining an appropriate sen-
tence.33 It was felt that confidentiality would ensure against a 
chilling effect on sources of such information, thus protecting 
the quality of presentence reports.S4 However, this "free flow of 
information" rationale has been proven false by empirical 
analysis.3Ci 
Although full disclosure is mandated by Rule 32(c), there 
are three exceptions.36 A presentence report will not be dis-
to disclose the report upon request. Id. Subsequent empirical analysis revealed that de-
fendants frequently failed to request disclosure, or requested disclosure only shortly 
before sentencing, thus allowing for only a hurried and, perhaps, cursory inspection of 
the report. Id. On the basis of the empirical data, FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c) was revised in 
1983 to require disclosure of the presentence report to defendants, even where a request 
was not forthcoming. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1578. 
32. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1579 (citing United States v. Charmer Indus., Inc., 711 
F.2d 1164, 1171) (injunction against the Arizona Attorney General's use of corporation's 
presentence report in a liquor license proceeding). 
33. Id. at 1579. 
34. Id. at 1580. 
35. Fennell & Hall, supra note 26, at 1689 commented: 
In general, we found that disclosure has been acheived without 
the serious repercussions predicted by the opponents of the 
mandatory disclosure rule. The character of the sentencing 
proceeding has not changed, the sources of information have 
not diminished appreciably, and the effectiveness of the 
presentence report has not decreased. To the contrary ... it 
has brought greater objectivity to the entire sentencing 
process. 
36. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A). This section provides: 
At a reasonable time before imposing sentence the court shall 
permit the defendant and his counsel to read the report of the 
presentence investigation exclusive of any recommendation as 
to sentence, but not to the extent that in the opinion of the 
court the report contains diagnostic opinions which if dis-
closed, might seriously disrupt a program of rehabilitation; or 
sources of information obtained upon a promise of confidenti-
ality; or any other information which, if disclosed, might result 
in harm, physical or otherwise, to the defendant or other per-
sons. The court shall afford the defendant and his counsel an 
opportunity to comment on the report and, in the discretion 
of the court, to introduce testimony or other information re-
lating to any alleged factual inaccuracy contained in it. 
5
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closed: 1) if it contains diagnostic opinions which could seriously 
disrupt a program of rehabilitation;S7 2) if it contains informa-
tion obtained under a promise of confidentiality;SS and 3) if it 
contains information which might cause harm to the defendant 
or other person.89 If any of the above exceptions arise, the court 
shall provide an oral or written summary of the factual informa-
tion in the report to the defendant and his counse1.40 The Parole 
Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976 ("Parole Act")41 
contains the same three exceptions to full disclosure to a pris-
oner within thirty days of a parole hearing.42 
While Rule 32 ordinarily requires the presentence report to 
be disclosed to the defendant, copies of the report must be re-
turned to the probation office immediately after sentencing, un-
less the court directs otherwise.4S The efficacy of requiring a sen-
37.Id. 
38.Id. 
39.Id. 
40. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(B) states: 
If the court is of the view that there is information in the 
presentence report which should not be disclosed under subdi-
vision (c)(3)(A) of this rule, the court in lieu of making the 
report or part thereof available shal1 state oral1y or in writing 
a summary of the factual information contained therein to be 
relied on in determining sentence, and shal1 give the defend-
ant and his counsel an opportunity to comment thereon. The 
statement may be made to the parties in camera. 
41. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (1976) (repealed 1987). The Comprehensive Crime Con-
trol Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 3581-
3586 (1986 Supp.», has revised the federal system of sentencing that was in place at the 
time the Parole Act was adopted. It mandates that al1 sentences be for fixed terms and 
eliminates the possibility of parole before the term is completed. Id. The Parole Act will 
remain in effect for five years, in order that the Parole Commission continue to make 
parole decisions for individuals sentenced before November 1, 1987. Id. 
42. 18 U.S.C. § 4208(c) (1976) (repealed 1987). The prisoner shall not be provided 
access to: 
(1) diagnostic opinions which, if made known to the eligible 
prisoner, could lead to a serious disruption of his institutional 
program; 
(2) any document which reveals sources of information ob-
tained on a promise of confidentiality; or 
(3) any other information which, if disclosed, might result in 
harm, physical or otherwise, to any person. 
43. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(E). This provision is ostensibly to insure that unautho-
rized persons do not gain access to the confidential report. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 advi-
sory committee's note.; United States v. Charmer Indus., 711 F.2d 1164, 1172 (2d Cir. 
1983). Conversely, 18 U.S.C. § 4208(b) (1976) (repealed 1987) contained no express re-
quirement that the inmate return any or all copies of the report, only that he have "rea-
sonable access to [the] report or other document to be used by the Commission in mak-
6
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tenced defendant to return his copy of the report was recently 
tested in the Ninth Circuit in Berry u. Dep't of Justice."'''' Berry, 
a sentenced offender awaiting a parole hearing, brought a re-
quest under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")"'1i for dis-
closure of copies of his presentence report."'6 His request was di-
rected at the United States Parole Commission."'7 The court held 
that the report was an agency record for purposes of the FOIA 
and thus allowed Berry access."'8 Applying a two-prong test, the 
ing its parole determination." United States Dep't of Justice v. Julian, 108 S. Ct. 1606, 
1610 (1988). 
44. 733 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1984). 
45. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1982) requires that each agency, in accordance with pub-
lished rules, shall make available for public inspection and copying: 
(A) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opin-
ions, as well as orders, made in adjudication of cases; 
(B) those statements of policy and interpretations which have 
been adopted by the agency and are not published in the Fed-
eral Register; and 
(C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that 
affect a member of the public; 
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1982) states the following: 
Except with respect to the records made available under 
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, each agency, upon 
any request for records which (A) reasonably describes such 
records and (B) is made in accordance with published rules 
stating time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be fol-
lowed, shall make the records promptly available to any 
person. 
The law was initiated by Congress and signed by President Johnson with several key 
concerns: 
[T]hat disclosure be the general rule, not the exception; that 
all individuals have equal rights of access; ... that the burden 
be on the Government to justify the withholding of a docu-
ment, not on the person requesting it; . . . that individuals 
improperly denied access to documents have right to seek in-
junctive relief in the courts; ... that there be a change in Gov-
ernment policy and attitude. 
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION 
SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1967) at 1. 
46. Berry, 733 F.2d at 1345. Berry was given a copy of his presentence report thirty 
days prior to his parole hearing and given one hour to view it. [d. at n. 3. 
47. The report is forwarded to the Bureau of Prisons and the Parole Commission 
and is relied upon in making correctional decisions affecting the prisoner. Berry, 733 
F.2d at 1346, 18 U.S.C. § 4205(e) (1976) (repealed 1987). The Parole Commission is re-
quired to rely upon, inter alia, the presentence report in making parole determinations. 
18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1976) (repealed 1987). 
48. Berry, 733 F.2d at 1356. In doing so, the court put limitations on disclosure by 
qualifying FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A) and Section 8 of The Parole Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
4208(b), as withholding statutes within the contemplation of the FOIA scheme. Berry, 
733 F.2d at 1354. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) provides that the FOIA does not apply to matters 
that are: 
7
Nakamura: Criminal Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1989
98 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:91 
court found that because the report was 1) in the possession of 
an agency (the United States Parole Commission), and 2) was 
prepared substantially to be relied upon in agency decision mak-
ing, it was an agency record.'& 
The issue of disclosure to the subject of the presentence re-
port under the FOIA was also addressed by the Supreme Court 
in United States Dep't of Justice v. Julian. 50 In Julian, the two 
respondents, federal prisoners, again sought copies of their 
presentence reports from the United States Parole Commission, 
which denied the requests.51 The Court held that the FOIA re-
quires the presentence report to be disclosed to the subject of 
the report, except for portions which contain matters pertaining 
to confidential sources, diagnostic opinions, and possibly harm-
ful information, in which case Rule 32 or the Parole Act con-
trol. 52 The government's contentions that presentence reports 
fall under certain exemptions53 of the FOIA were rejected.M In 
[S)pecifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 
section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) re-
quires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a 
manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) estab-
lishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular 
types of matters to be withheld. 
Thus, "the FOIA will probably entitle the defendant to copies of that which they were 
shown at sentencing and no more." Berry, 733 F.2d at 1354, n.17. On remand, the gov-
ernment could assert any alternative exemption under the FOIA which might apply. [d. 
at 1356. 
49. Berry, 733 F.2d at 1349. The court noted that documents that are substantially 
prepared for use in agency decisionmaking are precisely those that the FOIA intended to 
disclose. [d. at 1350. 
50. 108 S. Ct. 1606 (1988). 
51. [d. at 1607. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
52. Julian, 108 S. Ct. at 1611. The Court did not follow the Ninth Circuit ruling in 
Berry that FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 4208(c) are witholding statutes 
under FOIA contemplation, but came to the same conclusion that the exemption lan-
guage contained in both statutes applied to the request. Julian, 108 S. Ct. at 1611. 
53. The government argued that 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) did apply. Julian, 108 S. Ct. at 
1611. See supra note 48 for text. 
The government also argued applicability of 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), which provides an 
exemption for "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be 
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency." Julian, 
108 S. Ct. at 1613. The Court stated that the test under exemption 5 was whether the 
documents would be routinely or normally disclosed upon a showing of relevance. [d. at 
1613. However, the Court found "there is good reason to differentiate between a govern-
mental claim of privilege for presentence reports when a third party is making the re-
quest and such a claim when the request is made by the subject of the report." [d. at 
1614. 
54. Julian, 108 S. Ct. at 1612. 
8
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doing so, the Supreme Court settled what had been a contro-
versy between two circuits.1I1I 
C. DISCLOSURE To THIRD PARTIES 
v Rule 32(c) is silent as to disclosure to third parties.1I6 Fed-
eral courts have generally treated presentence reports as confi-
dential documents and have used their discretion when enter-
taining requests for disclosure to third parties.1I7 However, 
disclosure to third parties has been invariably denied.1I8 
In Hancock Brothers Inc. v. Jones,1I9 civil antitrust plaintiffs 
were denied access to government presentence memoranda.60 
The memoranda were prepared in connection with the sentenc-
ing of the defendants in earlier criminal antitrust proceedings.61 
The documents contained information obtained in proceedings 
before a grand jury.62 Citing the policy of maintaining the se-
crecy of grand jury proceedings,63 the district court held that 
disclosure of such information would be proper only if a compel-
ling necessity had been shown with particularity.64 Further, the 
district court held that this standard also applied to disclosure 
of presentence reports. The court felt that confidential informa-
tion contained in such reports should not be revealed to third 
55. The lower court decision, Julian v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 806 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 
1986), conflicted with Durns v. Bureau of Prisons, 804 F.2d 701, (D.C. Cir.) (prisoner's 
attempt to obtain a copy of his presentence report through the FOIA was denied under 5 
U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) exemption), reh'g denied, 806 F.2d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1986), petition for 
cert. filed, No. 86-6550. 
56. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1578. 
57. [d. at 1579. 
58. United States v. Charmer Indus., 711 F.2d 1164, 1173 (2nd Cir. 1983). "No re-
ported case, and only one unreported case, has been called to our attention in which a 
court has ordered the disclosure of a presentence report to a third party." [d. 
59. 293 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. Cal. 1968). 
60. Hancock, 293 F. Supp. at 1231. 
61. [d. 
62. [d. 
63. [d. at 1231-32. 
64. [d. at 1232. Those few courts which have discussed the threshold showing of 
need required by third party requests have done so setting a standard approaching that 
for disclosure of grand jury information. Charmer, 711 F.2d at 1174. See: United States 
v. Cyphers, 553 F.2d 1064, 1069 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 843 (1977) (defendant 
was not denied effective assistance of counsel by inability to obtain presentence report 
regarding government witness); United States v. Figurski, 545 F.2d 389, 391 (4th Cir. 
1976) (no disclosure of report regarding witness); United States v. Krause, 78 F.R.D. 203, 
204 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (no disclosure to defendant's judgment creditor). 
9
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parties unless it is required to meet the ends of justice.66 In 
Hancock, the plaintiffs did not meet this threshold 
requirement.66 
In United States v. Walker,67 a defendant found guilty of 
passing a forged United States treasury check was denied access 
to a codefendant's presentence report.68 The defendant con-
tended that the report might contain statements by the code-
fendant inconsistent with his testimony at trial and therefore 
should be revealed.69 The district court based its denial of access 
to the codefendant on an informal report to the court by the 
probation officer which stated that there was no exonerating evi-
dence in the presentence report.70 
Similarly, in United States v. Figurski,71 the presentence 
report of a hostile witness in a criminal trial was withheld from 
the defendant.72 The court found that, in general, when disclos-
ure of the report is requested by the defendant in order to deter-
mine whether there is any impeachment material pertaining to 
the witness, the district court should examine the report in cam-
era. The court should then disclose any part of the report which 
contains exculpatory materia1.7S If the report contains material 
65. Hancock, 293 F. Supp. at 1233. 
66. Id. at 1233. The court found that the only reasons for disclosure articulated by 
the plaintiffs involved avoidance of expense and additional work. Compelling necessity 
was not met by a request in the name of mere convenience. Id. at 1232. 
67. 491 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1974). 
68. Id. at 237-38. 
69. Id. at 238. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), where the Court held 
that "[t)he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorabljl to an accused upon 
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punish-
ment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." See also: Walker, 
491 F.2d at 238. 
70. Walker, 491 F.2d at 238. Other courts have denied criminal defendants access to 
a codefendant's presentence report. See, e.g.: United States v. Martinello, 556 F.2d 1215 
(5th Cir. 1977) (withholding of the codefendant's presentence report was proper as the 
report contained none of the information alleged by defense counsel) and United States 
v. Greathouse, 484 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1973) (evidence in the report that the codefendant 
was a pathological liar was not likely to change the verdict as the judge was already 
convinced of this). 
71. 545 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1976). 
72. Figurski, 545 F.2d at 389. See also: United States v. Anderson, 724 F.2d 596 (7th 
Cir. 1984) (defendant seeking the presentence report of a hostile witness, previously con-
victed for the same robbery) and United States v. Evans, 454 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1972) 
(defendant requesting the presentence report of government witness who previously 
pleaded guilty to the same post office burglary). 
73. Figurski, 545 F.2d at 392. 
10
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that could be used to impeach the witness, then disclosure is 
only available when there is a reasonable likelihood of affecting 
the trier of fact.7' Such likelihood depends upon the importance 
of the witness to the case, the extent to which the witness has 
already been impeached, and the significance of the material to 
the impeachment of the witness.7Ii 
The court, in United States v. Charmer Industries,78 
granted the defendant an injunction to prevent use by the Ari-
zona Attorney General of a presentence report.77 The report was 
to be used as additional evidence in a proceeding to revoke the 
defendant's liquor licenses in that state.78 Citing Hancock,79 the 
Second Circuit held that disclosure of the presentence report 
should only occur if it was necessary to meet the ends of jus-
tice.80 The court was concerned that these reports frequently 
contain hearsay statements, information not relevant to the 
crime, and misinformation.81 Although in the context of sentenc-
ing the trial court justifiably uses all information not disputed 
by the defendant, the court held that a presumption of accuracy 
should not be applied in an unrelated context.82 In considering 
whether a third party has shown a compelling need for disclos-
ure, the Second Circuit felt that the central element was the de-
gree to which that party could not obtain the information from 
74. Id. at 391. 
75. Id. at 391-92. 
76. 711 F.2d 1164 (2d Cir. 1983). 
77. Id. at 1167. 
78. Id. at 1168. 
79. 293 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. Cal. 1969). See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying 
text. 
80. Charmer, 711 F.2d at 1175. The court further felt that a compelling demonstra-
tion was needed in order to show that the ends of justice would be met by disclosure. Id. 
81. Id. Although disclosure to the subject of the report is required, there is no op-
portunity for the defendant to confront the source of a disputed hearsay statement. Id. 
Even if the defendant successfully challenges the accuracy of the statement, it remains 
in the report, although the court should not rely upon it in its sentencing determination. 
Id. See also: United States v. Pugliese, 805 F.2d 1117 (2nd Cir. 1986) (When hearsay is 
admitted into evidence through the presentence report and defendant challenges its ve-
racity, the government must introduce corroborating proof.). Additionally, defendants 
sometimes do not object to such statements, viewing them as inconsequential in the con-
text of sentencing, or considering it a waste of time, given the conviction at hand. 
Charmer, 711 F.2d at 1175. Thus, although FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c) provides safeguards 
which help point out misinformation in the report, it does not follow that misinforma-
tion is never contained in it. Charmer, 711 F.2d at 1175. 
82. Charmer, 711 F.2d at 1176. 
11
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other sources.83 
The court, in Berry v. Dep't of Justice,84 in granting the 
defendant disclosure of his presentence report, commented on 
the possibility of third party access under the FOIA scheme.81i 
The Ninth Circuit looked to the language of FOIA exemption 
(6),86 which states that exempt from disclosure are "personnel 
and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would 
constitute a cleary unwarranted invasion of privacy."87 Looking 
to case law,88 the court found "little difficulty" in concluding 
that presentence reports constitute "similar files" under the 
FOIA.89 Thus, third parties seeking disclosure would be denied 
if such disclosure constituted "a clearly unwarranted invasion of 
privacy."9o 
The Berry court also commented that third party access is 
not completely barred in those circuits where the reports are not 
agency records subject to FOIA disclosure.91 "If disclosure of a 
report is necessary to serve the ends of justice, courts will order 
disclosure." "Thus, whether or not presentence reports are 
agency records, occasional disclosure to third parties is both in-
evitable and desirable."92 
83. [d. at 1177. In this instance, the court found that nearly all the relevant infor-
mation in the report was also contained in the government's plea memorandum. [d. The 
Arizona Attorney General also made no showing that he could not gain just as much 
information as contained in the report from interviewing the investigating law enforce-
ment officials. [d. at 1178 
84. 733 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1984). 
85. [d. at 1352-53. 
86. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1982). 
87. [d. 
88. The phrase "similar files" has been given an expansive interpretation. Berry, 733 
F.2d at 1353. See United States Dep't of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 
(1982) (information as to whether Iranian nationals held valid passports); Harbolt v. 
Dep't of State, 616 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1980) (names and addresses of citizens imprisoned 
in foreign countries for narcotics violations), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856 (1980); Milizia v. 
Dep't of Justice, 519 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (criminal "rap sheet") and Metropoli-
tan Life Insur. Co. v. Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1976) (job evaluations). 
89. Berry, 733 F.2d at 1353. 
90. [d. However, the court declined to define the term "clearly unwarranted." [d. 
91. [d. at 1352. 
92. [d. 
12
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D. COMMON LAW RIGHT OF ACCESS 
In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,93 the materials 
in contention were the "Watergate Tapes," introduced into evi-
dence in the trial of several of the ex-President's former advisers 
in connection with the Watergate investigation.9• The Supreme 
Court affirmed a general common law right to inspect and copy 
public records and documents, including judicial records and 
documents.911 The necessity for access pursuant to the common 
law right has been found, for example, where the party has man-
ifested a "desire to keep a watchful eye on the workings of pub-
lic agencies ... and in a newspaper publisher's intention to pub-
lish information concerning the operation of government .... "96 
However, the right to inspect and copy judicial records is not 
absolute.97 Every court has control over its own court files. 98 
93. 435 U.S. 589 (1978). 
94. [d at 589. 
95. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598-99. The common law right to access judicial records and 
document3 has been applied in a number of different situations. See, e.g.: Seattle Times 
v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 845 F.2d 1513 (9th Cir. 1988) (pretrial detention document3); Littlejohn 
v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1988) (confidential document3 in a product3 liability 
suit); FTC v. Standard Fin. Management Corp., 830 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1987) (sworn per-
sonal financial statement); United States v. Raffoul, 826 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1987) (court 
transcript3); United States v. Smith, 787 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1986) (transcript of sidebar 
conference) and Columbia Broadcasting System v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 765 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 
1985) (document3 pertaining to a motion for reduction in sentence). See also: Nicholas v. 
Gamso, 35 N.Y.2d 712, 315 N.E.2d 770 (1974) (part3 of court file relating to sustained 
charges against a judge in a disciplinary proceeding); People v. Sharman, 17 Cal. App. 3d 
550, 95 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1971) (defendant's criminal record and all public official records 
filed in the cause) and New York Post v. Leibowitz, 2 N.Y.2d 677,143 N.E.2d 256 (1957) 
(transcript of trial judge's charge to jury). 
96. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-98. 
97. [d. at 598. 
98. [d. at 599. Where access may become a vehicle for an improper purpose, the 
court may deny the common law right. [d. Such was the case where the court records 
contained "the painful and sometimes disgusting details of a divorce case," which might 
be "used to gratify private spite or promote public scandal." [d. (quoting In re Caswell, 
18 R.1. 835, 836, 29 A. 259, 260 (1893) (transcript of proceedings in a divorce suit». 
Similarly, court3 have denied access to their files where such would become sources of 
"libelous statements for press consumption," [d. (citing Park v. Detroit Free Press Co., 
72 Mich. 560, 568, 40 N.W. 731,734-35 (1888) (pleadings and other document3 in a libel 
suit back for new tria!), or "business information which might harm a litigant's competi-
tive standing." [d. (citing Flexmir, Inc. v. Herman, 40 A.2d 799, 800 (N.J. Ch. 1945» 
(injunction to restrain defendant3 from using or divulging trade secret3). See also: News-
Press Publishing Co. v. State (345 So. 2d 865 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (denial of inspec-
tion of depositions in a criminal case where disclosure of such would endanger a person's 
life) and Estate of Hearst. 67 Cal. App. 3d 777. Cal. Rptr. 821 (1977) (portions of probate 
records of a member of a well known and wealthy family temporarily sealed because 
13
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While approving of this general rule, the Court in Nixon de-
clined to delineate the exact parameters of the common law 
right, stating that access is a decision best left to the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court "in light of the relevant facts and cir-
cumstances of the particular case. "99 
United States v. Edwardsloo involved a request seeking per-
mission to copy all audio and video tapes introduced into evi-
dence for broadcast to the public during the pendency of the 
tria1.10l The Seventh Circuit addressed the question left unan-
swered by Nixon,102 namely the strength of the presumption 
favoring public access. lOS The court, adopting the majority ap-
proach,lo, held that there is a strong presumption in favor of a 
common law right to inspect and copy judicial records which 
may only be denied on the basis of "articulable facts known to 
the court, not on the basis of unsupported hypothesis or conjec-
ture."IOIl The district court was faced with the task of balancing 
the defendant's right to a fair trialloe against the common law 
family members and trust proprieties were subject to a series of terrorist attacks). 
99. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 603. The Court found it unnecessary to analyze the balancing 
factors in order to reach a decision, for it found that "[aln additional, unique element" 
was dispositive of the case. [d. In the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preserva-
tion Act, 44 U.S.C. 2107 (1982), Congress had already created an administrative proce-
dure for processing and releasing to the public all of petitioner's presidential material, 
including the tape recordings at issue. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 603. 
100. 672 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1982). 
101. [d. at 1290. 
102. Nixon, 435 U.S. 597 (1978). See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text. 
103. Edwards, 672 F.2d at 1293-94. 
104. [d. See also: In re Application of Nat'l Broadcasting Co. (United States v. 
Criden), 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981) (where pretrial suppression, due process, and en-
trapment hearings disclosed, there was a "strong presumption that material introduced 
into evidence at trial should be made reasonably accessible ... "); In re Application of 
Nat'l Broadcasting Co. (United States v. Jenrette), 653 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (access 
to copies of audio and video tapes introduced into evidence "may be denied only if ... 
justice so requires") and In re Application of Nat'l Broadcasting Co. (United States v. 
Myers) (only compelling circumstances should prevent contemporaneous access to evi-
dence introduced at a criminal trial). But c/.: Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F. 2d 
423 (5th Cir. 1981) (public right of access viewed as subordinate to the defendant's com-
peting right to a fair trial). 
105. Edwards, 672 F.2d at 1294. 
106. [d. at 1291. The trial court considered three factors in deciding against access. 
[d. First, because the trial was as yet unresolved, access might be seen as placing a judi-
cial stamp upon evidence which might later be overcome through testimony. [d. There-
fore, the pendency of the trial was given considerable weight. [d. Second, the defendant 
had yet to be tried on other counts which had been severed from this proceeding. [d. 
Although stating that proper voir dire should solve the problem, the court nevertheless 
offered some concern over impaneling an impartial jury in a later trial. [d. Finally, a 
14
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right of access. 107 Although ruling that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying access, the Seventh Circuit found 
that concerns over impaneling an impartial jury in any future 
trial of the defendant were speculative and not a proper factor 
to be considered.108 
In another recent decision, Valley Broadcasting Co. u. 
United States Dist. Court,109 the Ninth Circuit adopted the 
strong presumption in favor of public access to judicial records 
and documents. llo This case also involved a request to copy au-
dio tapes introduced into evidence for broadcast during the pen-
dency of the trial.lll Citing Edwards,ll2 the court held that the 
factors asserted by the district court against access were inade-
quate to overcome the strong presumption favoring the common 
law right to inspect or copy judicial records.1l3 
The common law right to access presentence reports was 
commented on, in dictum, by the Ninth Circuit in Columbia 
Broadcasting System u. United States District Court.1l4 The 
defendant in the underlying case pleaded guilty to drug and tax 
evasion charges. lUI As part of the plea bargain, the defendant 
agreed to testify, if called, at the celebrated John DeLorean 
trial. 1l6 Subsequently, he filed a motion to reduce his sen-
recent resolution of the Judicial Conference of the United States which reaffirmed the 
ban against broadcasting trials was found relevant in weighing against access. [d. 
107. [d. 
108. [d. at 1296. 
109. 798 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1986). 
110. [d. at 1294. 
111. [d. at 1290. 
112. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289. See supra notes 103-108 and accompanying text. 
113. Valley Broadcasting, 798 F.2d at 1289. The district court asserted that provid-
ing the media with tapes as they were introduced into evidence was an administrative 
inconvenience and further that the danger of loss or erasure of the original tapes should 
militate against access. [d. at 1294. Additionally, the court articulated concerns about 
jury misconduct and, as in Edwards, 672 F.2d at 1289, the possibility of complications in 
impaneling an unbiased jury in upcoming trials. Valley Broadcasting, 798 F.2d at 1289. 
The Ninth Circuit held that the logistics of supplying the media with tapes on a day-by-
day basis were not insurmountable, provided that certain cooperative steps were taken 
by the broadcasters. [d. at 1295-96. The other arguments against release of the tapes 
were deemed conjecture, save for one reference to the defendant in an as yet untried 
connected case. [d. at 1296. 
114. 765 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1985). 
115. [d. at 824. 
116. United States v. DeLorean, 561 F.Supp. 797 (C.D. Cal. 1983). 
15
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tence.1l7 The motion, along with the government's response, 
were filed under seal.1l8 Finding insufficient specificity in the in-
terests asserted by the government, the court ordered the docu-
ments disclosed.ll9 However, the court commented: 
"Our opinion is not to be read to disapprove the 
practice of keeping presentence reports confiden-
tial .... We do not reach that issue, for this case 
is distinguishable. The issue here concerns a pro-
ceeding under Rule 35, and nothing in the Rule's 
language, history, or judicial interpretation sug-
gests that documents filed in support of motions 
for reduction of sentence should be treated in the 
same manner as presentence reports. In the ab-
sence of explicit legislative intent to the contrary, 
the general presumption of openness will 
prevail. "120 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In United States v. Schlette,l2l each petitioner offered sepa-
rate and distinct arguments with which to demonstrate its par-
ticular need for release of the presentence report. 122 Accordingly, 
the Ninth Circuit separately analyzed each party's need for dis-
closure.128 The court stated that a third party need only make a 
threshold showing that disclosure would serve the ends of jus-
tice.124 Whether such a need exists would be a matter within the 
discretion of the trial judge.1211 Once this is demonstrated, the 
decision of whether disclosure is warranted would require the 
court to balance the need for disclosure against the reasons for 
confidentiality.126 The court emphasized that "if the reasons for 
maintaining confidentiality do not apply at all in a given case, or 
apply only to an insignificant degree, the party seeking disclos-
ure should not be required to demonstrate a large compelling 
117. CBS, 765 F.2d at 824. 
118. [d. 
119. [d. at 825. 
120. [d. at 826. 
121. 842 F.2d 1574 (9th Cir. 1988). 
122. [d. at 1576. 
123. [d. at 1581-84. 
124. [d. at 1581 
125. [d. 
126. [d. 
16
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need."127 
A. THE NEWSPAPER'S ARGUMENT 
The court determined that the newspaper's interest in ob-
taining Schlette's presentence report was not founded on an im-
proper purpose, such as exploiting the tragic details of Schlette's 
life or the sensationalism of the Weissich murder.l2S In fact, the 
court reasoned that, by publishing the desired information, a le-
gitimate public interest in the inner workings of the criminal 
justice system would be served.129 The particulars of the case 
only served to strengthen the public interest. lSO 
The court elaborated further, stating that public awareness 
of the mechanisms of the criminal justice system serves the ends 
of justice by giving the public sufficient information with which 
to join in a dialogue about the courts and the treatment of de-
fendants. 131 "If the system has flaws, it is all the better that 
these flaws be exposed and subjected to public comment.1!l32 
Regarding the government's position favoring competing in-
terests, the court stated that privacy concerns may still militate 
against disclosure in a given case.IS3 When it considered Berry, 
the Ninth Circuit observed that, under FOIA exemption (6), dis-
closure of the defendant's "previous criminal record, early life 
and developmental history, school and employment record, 
mental and physical condition, religion, habits, attitudes, associ-
ates and other pertinent factors" cannot be revealed to third 
parties seeking disclosure under FOIA if such disclosure would 
constitute "a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy."134 How-
127. Id. (quoting United States Indus. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 345 F.2d 18, 21 (9th Cir.) 
(memorandum pertaining to imposition of sentences and fines in an antitrust suit held 
proper object of federal discovery proceeding), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965». 
128. Id. at 1582. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 1582-83. The court pointed to the facts of the case, stating "[tJhe public 
is legitimately interested when a former public prosecutor is murdered by a felon whose 
conviction he obtained. This public interest is particularly strong when the felon who has 
vowed to kill his prosecutor shoots the pr~secutor dead while out on probation for a 
firearm offense." I d. 
131. Id. at 1583. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 1581. 
134. Id. at 1580-81 (quoting Berry v. Dep't. of Justice, 733 F.2d 1343, 1353 (9th Cir. 
17
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ever, the court found that, analogous to suits for defamation, 
privacy interests are personal to the individual and do not sur-
vive that person's death. lSG Thus, this ground for nondisclosure 
was unavailable. ls6 
The government additionally argued for nondisclosure in or-
der to prevent a chilling effect on future sources of information 
regarding presentence reports. IS? This line of reasoning assumes 
that sources of information important to the quality of 
presentence reports will dry up if confidentiality is not pre-
served.lss The "free flow of information" rationale was deemed 
insufficient in light of the empirical evidence to the contrarylS9 
and when balanced with the newspaper's common law right of 
access.140 Accordingly, the newspaper was entitled to disclosure 
of the presentence report, subject to any appropriate deletions 
by the district court. W 
B. THE ESTATE'S ARGUMENT 
The heart of the estate's argument for release of the 
presentence report was that it was required in order to deter-
mine whether the probation service was negligent in its failure 
to warn Weissich of any danger posed to him by Schlette.142 In 
response, the government asserted that this was nothing more 
than a request for disclosure to facilitate a civil lawsuit, and 
therefore was not a sufficient showing of need to breach the con-
fidentiality of the presentence report. 14S While generally in 
1984)). Because disclosure was warranted without reference to the FOIA, the issue of 
whether presentence reports in the hands of the court probation service should be sub-
ject to FOIA disclosure was not considered. [d. at 1581 n.2. 
135. [d. at 1581. See, e.g.: Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. 721 F.2d 506, 509 
(5th Cir. 1983) ("In Texas, a suit for defamation is personal to the one about whom the 
statements are made."); Stein-Sapir v. Birdsell, 673 F.2d 165, 167 (6th Cir. 1982) (under 
Ohio law, "actions for libel or slander abate with the death of either party") and Grus-
chus v. Curtis Publishing Co., 342 F.2d 775, 776 (10th Cir. 1965) (defamation action did 
not survive the death of the defamed party). 
136. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1581. 
137. [d. at 1580. 
138. [d. 
139. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
140. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1584. 
141. [d. 
142. [d. 
143. [d. 
18
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agreement with the government's position, the court was con-
cerned that the information sougpt could not be obtained from 
another source.144 The court noted that, while the estate might 
depose the probation officers and the psychiatrist as the govern-
ment suggested, such discovery would not produce the report it-
self, which was relevant to the estate's contemplated suit.1411 As 
with the newspaper's request, the court found that the govern-
ment had not articulated a valid reason to offset the estate's 
threshold showing of need for disclosure. 146 
v. CRITIQUE 
In United States v. Schlette,147 the Ninth Circuit purported 
to use well established criteria and existing law in its determina-
tion of whether to disclose a presentence report to a third party. 
Yet, contrary to every previously reported opinion,146 the court 
granted the requests of these third parties for disclosure.149 In 
light of changing attitudes in the legislature (towards expanded 
disclosure to the defendant and diversified use of the report) 
and judicial decisions in Berry and Julian to allow for post-
sentence disclosure to the defendant under FOIA, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in Schlette seems to reflect the growing liberaliza-
tion of disclosure of the presentence report. 1110 In stating that a 
third party need only make a threshold showing that disclosure 
would serve the ends of justice, the court changed the initial 
burden of proof standard required of the third party requester. 
144. [d. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
145. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1584. The court reasoned that if the probation service 
knew of the threats Schlette had made against Weissich previously and did not include 
this information in the report, this was important. [d. If the probation service did in-
clude this information in the report, and the court decided in favor of probation for 
Schlette, this too was relevant. [d. Whatever information was contained in the 
presentence report, it was the report itself that was relevant to the estate's contemplated 
action. [d. 
146. [d. 
147. 842 F.2d 1574 (9th Cir. 1988). 
148. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
149. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1584. 
150. "These statutory concessions served as indicators that, by the early 1980s, the 
control that the federal courts had always assumed over presentence reports was less 
than absolute and could be challenged by statutorily mandated diversifications of the 
functions of court documents." Shockley, THE FEDERAL PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION RE-
PORT: POSTSENTENCE DISCLOSURE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, 90 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 79 (1987). 
19
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In doing so, the court apparently rejected the standard favored 
by other circuits, that of requiring the third party to show a 
compelling need. 1IH 
Well aware of the dicta contained in CBS/52 the court took 
the opportunity to make clear the fact that the Schlette opinion 
did not conflict with CBS.153 Although agreeing that presentence 
reports are confidential, the court stated that" 'confidentiality' 
is not some talismanic utterance" to invoke when refusing to 
disclose a presentence report when a sufficient showing for dis-
closure is made.154 However, the court in CBS also hinted that, 
because of legislative intent, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
32 may place more confidentiality on presentence reports than 
what was afforded the documents at issue there.155 In view of 
their decision in Schlette, as well as Berry and Julian, this 
statement seems both hollow and at odds with the trend in the 
Ninth Circuit. 
The court identified several arguments against disclosure of 
presentence reports advanced in previous decisions.156 First, the 
argument that disclosure would dry up sources of confidential 
information was rejected as not supported by empirical data. 157 
Similar arguments that courts would not receive sufficient infor-
mation upon which to fashion an appropriate sentence and that 
the quality of presentence reports would decline were dis-
counted.158 Thus, the only remaining concern left before the 
151. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. However, the court found that: 
We need not decide whether the Second Circuit's burden of 
proof is in conflict with our standard in third-party disclosure 
cases .... Even under the arguably higher "compelling need" 
standard set by Charmer, ... a sufficient threshold showing 
has been made in the present case to warrant disclosure, ab-
sent a legitimate reason for maintaining confidentiality. 
Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1579, n.1. 
152. CBS, 765 F.2d 823. 
153. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1583. 
154. [d. 
155. CBS, 765 F.2d at 826. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
156. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1577-81. 
157. [d. at 1581. Compare: United States v. McKnight, 771 F.2d 388, 390 (8th Cir. 
1985) (disclosure denied in order to ensure the free flow of information) and United 
States v. Charmer Indus., Inc., 711 F.2d 1164, 1171 (2nd Cir. 1983) (disclosure may ad-
versely affect the court's ability to obtain data on a confidential basis for use in the 
sentencing process). 
158. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1581. See: Comment, Proposed Changes in Presentence 
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court was the issue of privacy.1I19 Following the general rationale 
applied in defamation suits, the court found that Schlette's 
death foreclosed any argument that disclosure would be a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of privacy.16o 
In light of the court's finding that the government failed to 
show a legitimate reason for confidentiality, the court did not 
require the petitioners to demonstrate a large compelling need 
for disclosure.161 With that, the court remanded the case to the 
district court to redact information from the report, pursuant to 
a Rule 32(c)(3)(A) type determination of what information 
should remain confidential, and permit the petitioners to read 
the documents and make notes.162 If Mr. Schlette had been 
alive, the disclosure of a redacted version of the presentence re-
port still might have fallen short of a clearly unwarranted inva-
sion of privacy, for under the Schlette rationale, all sensitive in-
formation would have been expurgated prior to disclosure. 
With the rejection by the Ninth Circuit of all the arguments 
presented by the government, it remains to be seen whether the 
government could ever show a legitimate reason for keeping the 
presentence report confidential. Thus, the possibility of future 
disclosures of the report to third parties remains viable. Along 
with such a possibility comes inevitable questions. 
The court seemed to give only light regard to the warning 
contained in Charmer that the presumption of accuracy in the 
presentence report is not necessarily warranted in an unrelated 
context.163 The primary purpose of the report is to assist in de-
termining an appropriate sentence for the convicted criminal de-
fendant. 164 Defendants may have numerous motives in not dis-
puting statements contained in the presentence report.165 
Investigation Report Procedures, 66 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 56, 58 (1975) (examina-
tion of arguments for and against mandatory disclosure to the defendant and defense 
counsel before sentencing). 
159. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1581. 
160. Id. at 1581 (quoting Berry v. Dep't of Justice, 733 F.2d 1343, 1353 (9th Cir. 
1984)). 
161. Id. The court maintained that even though not required, a sufficient threshold 
showing of need was presented, absent a legitimate reason for confidentiality. Id. 
162. Id. at 1585. 
163. Charmer, 711 F.2d at 1176. 
164. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
165. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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Although courts may properly rely on the information contained 
in the report to reach a sentencing decision,188 perhaps the same 
may not be true of newspapers, civil litigants or others seeking 
disclosure in dissimilar contexts. Courts in the future may be 
faced with determining whether restrictions on the use of 
presentence reports by third parties may be properly imposed. 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit may have purposely reached its 
decision in Schlette without relying on the FOIA,187 in anticipa-
tion of the Supreme Court's ruling in Julian. 18s Although the 
majority in Julian felt that FOIA exemption (5) would preclude 
third party disclosure/89 Justice Scalia's dissenting opinionl70 
may have voiced concerns held by those on the Ninth Circuit as 
well. Justice Scalia contended that it was inaccurate for the 
Court to say "the reasoning of the cases denying disclosure to 
third party requesters would have little applicability to a request 
by a defendant to examine his own report .... "171 Justice 
Scalia stressed the interpretation that, under the FOIA, there is 
no such person as a "third party requester," since all FOIA re-
questers have equivalent status and equivalent rights to the 
public documents that the FOIA identifies.172 Thus, the individ-
uating characteristics of the requester should not be 
considered.178 
The Court in Julian took great pains to decide the case nar-
rowly. However, the possibility existed that it would extrapolate 
the interpretation that all requesters were of equal status, and 
allow for disclosure under the FOIA not only to the defendants, 
but to "any person" requesting the document. Had this been the 
case, it would seem fairly absurd that a third party, having been 
denied access under the common law, could then turn around 
and gain disclosure of the presentence report under the FOIA. 
166. Charmer, 711 F.2d at 1176. 
167. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
168. 108 S. Ct. 1606 (1988). The Julian case was decided in May of 1988, two 
months after the Ninth Circuit's decision in Schlette. 
169. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
170. Julian, 108 S. Ct. at 1614-19. 
171. [d. at 1618. 
172. [d. at 1618. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
173. Julian, 108 S. Ct. at 1617. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
United States v. Schlette174 sets a new precedent, in light of 
the fact that no prior recorded federal decision has allowed a 
third party access to a presentence report.17II Here, disclosure of 
the report was allowed to two third parties under a new stan-
dard of proof. A threshold showing of need, in the absence of a 
legitimate reason for maintaining confidentiality, will suffice in 
gaining disclosure. 
The portions of the opinion regarding the newspaper's com-
mon law right to access judicial records would appear to 
strengthen what is already a "strong presumption of access."176 
However, the facts of the case would seem to indicate that the 
newspaper's showing need not have been overpowering, for the 
government did not demonstrate a legitimate reason for denying 
disclosure. 
As stated in Hancock,177 the reasons for disclosing the 
presentence report to defendants is quite different from the 
need for disclosure to plaintiffs in a civil action.178 However, in 
approving disclosure to a third party seeking evidence upon 
which to base a negligence suit, the Ninth Circuit almost guar-
antees that Schlette will be cited in future requests. In enter-
taining those requests, the courts will most assuredly have to an-
alyze new arguments presented by the government for 
maintaining confidentiality, lest disclosure be automatic. This 
decision may someday aid in disclosing the presentence report of 
someone who, unlike Mr. Schlette, is not deceased. 
Kenneth Y. Nakamura* 
174. 842 F.2d 1574 (9th Cir. 1988). 
175. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
176. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
177. Hancock Bros., Inc. u. Jones, 293 F. Supp. 1229, 1233 (N.D. Cal. 1968). 
178. Id. at 1233. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1990. 
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